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ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
tion is helpless, because the much discussed section 203 (d) does
not give the President blanket power to override state constitu-
tions." The change of policy on the part of the administration
with respect to this provision is very significant. Although Sec-
retary Ickes had previously announced that as a matter of policy
the federal government would not make loans to municipalities
where such action was prohibited by the state constitution, this
statement goes farther and practically admits the complete lack
of power to do so.
These considerations point to the conclusion that the attempt
by Congress to advance public work funds to any state, county or
municipality, notwithstanding any constitutional or legal restric-
tion on the right or power of such state, county or municipality to
borrow money or to incur indebtedness is unconstitutional, since
it is an encroachment by the federal government upon the
sovereign powers reserved to the states.
EVELYN HONIGBERG, '35.
PRECEDENTS FOR FEDERAL BANK DEPOSIT
INSURANCE
The Banking Act of June, 1933, creates a Federal Deposit In-
surance Corporation the stock of which is to be subscribed for
by the United States Treasury, the Federal Reserve Banks and
members of the Federal Reserve system. Federal Reserve
Banks are required to own shares to the amount of one-half of
their surplus on January 1, 1933; member banks to the amount of
one-half of one per cent of their total deposit liabilities, to be
adjusted annually, subject to emergency assessments of an addi-
tional one-fourth of one per cent. Dividends may be declared.
Upon the closing of an enrolled bank the Corporation is to act as
receiver and pay insured depositors 100 per cent of their claims
up to $10,000, 75 per cent thereafter up to $50,000, and 50 per
cent of the amount of the claim in excess of the last sum. It is
then subrogated to the rights of these depositors until the amounts
of the insurance payments are recovered. The act is to go into
effect July 1, 1934. A temporary Deposit Insurance Fund is pro-
vided to begin January 1, 1934. State non-member banks may
participate in the scheme for a period of two years from this
date.'
This specimen of the new legislation, unlike many of its com-
panion pieces, possesses a definite parentage and history. The
guaranty of deposits is not new in state annals; early appear-
112 U. S. C. 264.
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ances in the nineteenth century2 were succeeded by remarkably
unsuccessful outcroppings during the last three decades.3 They
are now for the most part defunct or in process of liquidation. 4
Numerous controversies have arisen, and a number of judicial
decisions have clustered about certain mooted points. Many
similar questions are likely to rearise in connection with similar
provisions of the present act. It is the purpose of this note to
examine these questions chiefly in the light of the answers which
have already been given. The parallel, of course, cannot be re-
garded as perfect; it is, however, the best and most definite
standard of prediction at the present time.
There can be little apparent doubt as to the power of Congress
to create such a corporation under the extremely broad banking
powers early enunciated in McCulloch v. Maryland.5 From that
time up to the present, Congress' excursions into the field of bank-
ing have been, in the main, upheld with little question by the
federal courts.6 A superficial parallel suggests itself between the
Federal Reserve System and its compulsory reserves and the in-
stant act with its compulsory subscriptions to the Insurance
stock. The former has been upheld against the protests of a
member bank.7 In the past, however, most attacks upon the
Federal Reserve system have been from without; whereas, judg-
ing from the almost universal history of state guaranty schemes,
the future will see a number of complaints by solvent member
banks that they are being levied upon for the benefit of depositors
of failed or weak institutions.
The question of due process will most probably arise. What
cogency will it possess? It must be noted that although the
Supreme Court has allowed Congress a most extensive discretion
in choosing the means of carrying out its banking powers, never
2 In re Lee Bank (1860) 21 N. Y. 9; In re Reciprocity Bank (1860) 22
N. Y. 9; Elwood v. Treasurer of Vermont (1851) 23 Vt. 701; Receiver v.
State Treasurer (1866) 39 Vt. 92.
3 Oklahoma in 1907 (Snyder's Comp. Laws 1909, pp. 241-244); Kansas in
1909 (Gen. Stat. Kan., 1915, chap. 11, art. 2, secs. 595-612); Nebraska in
1909 (Laws Neb. 1909, chap. 10, p. 66) ; Texas in 1909 (Rev. Stat. 1911, arts.
445-517) ; South Dakota in 1915 (Rev. Code 1919, secs. 9005-9031); Mis-
sissippi in 1915 (H. Ann. Miss. Code 1917, sec. 2591): Washington in 1917
(Pierce's Code 1919, secs. 333-354) ; North Dakota in 1917 (Sess. Laws 1917,
chap 26, p. 177). For a thorough digest and comparative discussion of these
acts see Federal Reserve Bulletin, Sept. 1925, pp. 626-668.
4 See A. Butts Guaranty of Bank Deposits in Eight States (1931) 3 Miss.
Law Journal 186.
(1819) 4 Wheat. 316.
SOsborn v. Bank of United States (1824) 9 Wheat. 738; First Nat. Bank v.
Fellows (1917) 244 U. S. 416; Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co. (1921)
255 U. S. 180; Westfall v. United States (1927) 274 U. S. 256. See also
Veazie Bank v. Fenno (1869) 8 Wall. 533; Legal Tender Cases (1871) 12
Wall. 457; Juilliard v. Greenman (1884) 110 U. S. 421.
First Nat. Bank v. Murray (1914) 212 F. 140.
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has this discretion been declared unlimited. The wording in
McCulloch v. Maryland is significant, "all means which are ap-
propriate, which are plainly adapted to that end."' 8 A recent de-
cision interprets this as acknowledging the power of Congress to
act "within the limits of a just discretion." 9 With a notorious
exception' 0 the court has been loath to challenge Congress for
abuse of this discretion. Might its policy alter in the event the
present scheme proves impractical and burdensome upon solvent
members? In the light of the signally unsuccessful state guar-
anty acts the question is of more than academic significance.
Answer is aided by a series of important decisions in which the
Supreme Court passed upon the constitutionality of these acts,
and in which can be seen a growing tendency to limit legislative
discretion in this particular.
The classic case of Noble State Bank v. Haskel11" arose from an
attempt to enjoin the State Banking Board of Oklahoma from
collecting an assessment which amounted to two per cent of the
bank's total deposit liabilities. Upon the issue of due process
the constitutionality of the guaranty act was upheld as a valid
exercise of the police power. On a motion for a rehearing in
which the impracticality of so large an assessment was urged, the
court, through Mr. Justice Holmes, replied: "We fully under-
stand the practical importance of the question and the very power-
ful argument that can be made against the wisdom of the legis-
lature, but on that point we have nothing to say, as it is not our
concern." He added that in any case "there is no out and out
unconditional taking at all" as "payment can be avoided by going
out of the banking business."'1  This decision controlled several
subsequent cases.' 3
A new and for present purposes significant criterion was in-
troduced in the recent case of Abie State Bank v. Bryan.14 Here
the plaintiff in its own name and on behalf of several hundred
other state banks of Nebraska sought to enjoin the collection of
assessments totaling six-tenths of one per cent of their deposit
liabilities. It was urged that the guaranty law no longer served
any rational public purpose, and in practice merely took away
from the security of depositors in going banks in order to pay
depositors of an ever increasing number of failed banks. It was
8 Supra, n. 5 at p. 421.
9 First Nat. Bank v. Fellows, supra, n. 6 at p. 419.
10 Hepburn v. Griswold (1870) 8 Wall. 603 (the first legal tender case).
"1 (1911) 219 U. S. 104.
12 Supra, n. 11 at p. 580.
13 Shallenberger v. State Bank (1911) 219 U. S. 114 (the Nebraska act);
Assaria State Bank v. Dolley (1911) 219 U. S. 121 (Kansas); Abilene Nat.
Bank v. Dolley (1913) 228 U. S. 1 (Kansas).
14 (1931) 282 U. S. 765.
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found as fact by the trial court that two-thirds of the banks,
under existing conditions, were unable to pay compensatory
dividends after paying assessments which amounted to 8 per cent
of their capital. During the pendency of the appeal the legis-
lature provided a plan of liquidating the guaranty scheme and
reduced future assessments to a maximum of two-tenths of one
per cent for a period of only ten years. The court held that it
was not precluded by an earlier decision from holding the measure
invalid since "a police regulation, although valid when made,
may become, by reason of later events, arbitrary and confiscatory
in operation." 15 Further, the fact that the banks had exercised
their option of remaining state banks rather than ceasing to do
business or becoming members of the national system, did not
estop them from assailing the constitutionality of the act, since
"The fact that a choice was made according to interest does not
exclude duress."'16 In the light of the intervening legislation,
however, the injunction was denied: "Considering the reduction
in the extent of the obligation as to future assessments, we are
unable to say that the statute in this modified form is confiscatory,
or other than a reasonable method of liquidating the guaranty
plan."
The implications here are two-fold. There is no longer pres-
ent, as there might have been under the earlier decisions, an easy
solution of constitutional difficulties in the argument that a mem-
ber bank by remaining in the Federal Reserve system will waive
its rights to objections under the due process clause. More im-
portant is the tendency here evinced to construe the powers of
the state legislatures more strictly and to look more closely into
the practicality of the means employed by them. The parallel
between the Abie decision and the present problem is not per-
fect, but it is persuasive. In view of this tendency, the possi-
bility of the court's challenging the recent banking legislation,
although remote, is not beyond reason.
A question of more detail is that of the depositor's rights under
a guaranty act. It has been held generally that the depositor has
no vested interest in the guaranty funds which the legislature
cannot alter by subsequent statutes ;17 no contract duty is owing
him, rather he is the beneficiary of a bounty-"an act of grace by
the legislature, so far as the depositors were concerned."18 Hence
15 Lincoln Gas & Electric Co. v. City of Lincoln (1919) 250 U. S. 256; Allen
v. St. Louis, Iron Mt. R. Co. (1913) 230 U. S. 553; Smith v. Illinois Bell Tel.
Co. (1930) 282 U. S. 133.
16 See, A. T. & S. F. R. Co. v. O'Connor (1912) 223 U. S. 280; Union Pac.
R. Co. v. Public Service Comm. of Mo. (1918) 248 U. S. 67.
17 Wirtz v. Nestos (1924) 51 N. D. 603, 200 N. W. 524.
11 Abie State Bank v. Bryan, supra, n. 14, at p. 783; Wirtz v. Nestos,
supra, n. 17.
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a guaranteed depositor cannot complain if, subsequent to the
failure of his bank and the allotment of his claim, which was to
enjoy priority according to the time at which his bank had failed,
the legislature abolishes this order of precedence and prorates
the total amounts payable. 19 Again, depositors in failed banks
who hold certificates of indebtedness issued against the guaranty
fund are not legally injured by a repeal of the law in spite of the
fact that this may leave their claims unsatisfied. 20 It is suggested,
however, that one form of vested right may arise-the right of
all who possessed valid demands against the fund when money
came into it to have so much of that money divided among them
as is necessary to meet their demands; until then the legislature
cannot appropriate the funds for other uses.2 1
Matters of priority have provided frequent subjects for debate.
The present Federal act declares that upon paying insured de-
positors the Corporation "shall be subrogated to all rights against
the closed banks of the owners of such deposits and shall be en-
titled to receive the same dividends from the proceeds of the
assets of such closed bank as would have been payable to each
such depositor .... ,,22 Certain of the state acts gave express
preference to the claims of insured depositors. 23 In other states
where, as in the present act, no such express provision was in-
cluded, attempts were made to read from the purpose of the acts
an implied preference. This the courts refused to do.24 Indeed,
in one jurisdiction the court went to far as to disregard an ex-
pressly granted preference. 25
About the definition of the word "depositor" 26 has centered a
group of decisions the number of which, considering the relatively
few states and short period in which the guaranty laws were in
force, is extraordinarily large. The usual description is of little
practical value: "A depositor is one who delivers to or leaves
with a bank money, or checks and drafts, the commercial equiva-
lent of money, subject to his order, and by virtue of which action
the title to the money passes to the bank. ' 27 A clue to the actual
meaning follows: "The law will look through all semblances and
forms to ascertain the actual fact as to whether or not there has
been a bona fide deposit made."128 The distinction between a de-
19 Wirtz v. Nestos, supra, n. 18.
20 State v. Smith (N. D. 1931) 234 N. W. 764.
21 Ibid., at p. 781.
22 12 U. S. C., sec. 264 (L).
23 Lankford v. Oklahoma Engraving Co. (1913) 35 Okla. 404, 130 Pac. 278.2 4 State v. Duke (1922) 120 Wash. 13, 206 P. 918.
25 Anderson v. Baskin & Wilbourn (1917) 114 Miss. 81, 74 So. 682.
2612 U. S. C. sec. 264 (L).
27 Kidder v. Hall (1923) 113 Tex. 49, 251 S. W. 497, at p. 56.
28 Ibid., at p. 58.
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posit and a loan to the bank is particularly troublesome; both
create the debtor-creditor relationship ;29 solicitation on the part
of the bank is not of itself evidence of a loan ;30 nor the fact that
the certificate of deposit is payable only at a future date and not
subject to check ;31 one suggested distinction is that the payment
of a loan must be tendered by the bank at maturity, whereas the
deposit remains until withdrawn. 32 This, however, is a merely
mechanical rule; actual decisions are controlled by considerations
of the actual intent of the parties and the policy of the act.33
Certain typical and often recurring situations can be described.
Frequently stockholders or directors knowing their bank is
in a precarious situation will make large "deposits" on the very
eve of insolvency, hoping thus both to save their institution and
to come under the protection of the guaranty laws. The methods
used to encompass these ends are at times almost humorously
devious. In most cases the courts have seen through the subter-
fuge and pronounced these transactions "loans." 3 4 In Nebraska
they were expressly excluded by statute.35 Where the bank
agrees to pay the depositor a "bonus" in excess of the legal inter-
est rate on deposits the entire deposit is removed from protec-
tion.-6 Where, however, a third person interested in the success
of the bank pays the bonus, or where the depositor in good faith
believes a third person is paying it, the deposit is held good, on
the principle that it is desired only to exclude express agreements
for excess interest between bank and depositor.37 In pursuance
of this exception a deposit on which the cashier of the bank paid
a "bonus" was held good-surely a failure on the part of the court
to "look through all semblances." 3s  Where a deposit is made
under circumstances excluding it from the benefits of the guar-
29 State v. Smith, supra, note 20.
30 State v. Wayne County Bank (1924) 112 Neb. '792, 201 N. W. 907.
31 Shaw v. McBride (Civil App. Tex. 1928) 9 S. W. 2nd 410.
32 Ibid.
32 "It is not easy to formulate any specific test by which to determine in a
given case into which class a transaction falls." American State Bank v.
Wilson (1922) 110 Kan. 520, 204 Pac. 709, at p. 525; "intention and effect"
controls, Fourth Nat. Bank v. Wilson (1922) 110 Kan. 380, 204 Pac. 715.
34 State Banking Board v. James (Civil App. Tex. 1924) 264 S. W. 145;
State v. Atlas Bank of Neligh (1926) 114 Neb. 646, 209 N. W. 333; State v.
Farmers' State Bank (1925) 113 Neb. 348, 203 N. W. 572. But see State v.
Nebraska State Bank (1929) 118 Neb. 660, 225 N. W. 778 (deposits made in
"ordinary course of business").
:5 State v. Atlas Banks, supra, n. 34.
6 American State Bank v. Wilson (1922) 110 Kan. 520, 204 Pac. 709;
State v. Atlas Bank (1925) 113 Neb. 843, 205 N. W. 563.
,7 Farm Mortgage Trust Co. v. Wilson (1922) 110 Kan. 786, 205 Pac. 610;
Pitts v. People's Bank (1924) 137 Miss. 240, 102 So. 279.38 State v. Wayne County Bank, supra, n. 30.
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anty, but is later renewed in a legal form, the renewal is held to
cure the defects.39 It has even been held that, where an ac-
cumulation of excessive and illegal interest due on the first cer-
tificate of deposit is included in the principal of the certificate re-
newed at a legal rate, the latter is good. 40 Good faith holders of
certificates which do not represent "good" deposits are not pro-
tected. 41 There can be seen, however, a tendency to be lenient in
interpreting deposit transactions where a good faith holder is
concerned. 42 Cashier's checks are not included, 43 unless given
in exchange for the holder's check upon his deposit.4 4 Nor are
funds held by the bank as collection agent.45 There is conflict
as to whether special deposits are guaranteed, 40 logically those
who deny protection are more consistent, since the title to such
does not pass to the bank.47 Where a bank was given Liberty
Bonds to exchange for a later issue, converted them and later
gave the" owner a certificate of deposit in satisfaction of his tort
claim, the claim against the guaranty fund was not allowed.48
Where, however, the bank when a going concern refused to allow
a deposit claim, and the depositor secured a judgment for that
amount, he was allowed to partake in the fund to the extent of his
judgment and interest thereon.49
Many problems other than those mentioned above will un-
doubtedly present themselves for judicial determination. In-
deed, it is recognized that the decisions on which this discussion
is based can be only of persuasive, rather than binding, authority.
They cannot, however, fail to possess cogency in relation to the
many provisions of the Federal act which reproduce in essence
the state guaranty plans. When we leave such common denom-
inators, however, and turn to novel clauses in the present act,
interpretation on the relatively solid basis of prior decisions must
give way to something more nearly approaching pure prophecy-
a venture not within the scope of this note.
CHRISTIAN B. PEPER, '35.
39 Pitts v. People's Bank, supra, n. 37.
40 State v. American Exchange Bank (1926) 114 Neb. 626, 209 N. W. 217.
4 Fourth Nat. Bank of Wichita v. Wilson, supra, n. 33; State v. Kilgore
State Bank (1925) 113 Neb. 772, 205 N. W. 297.
42 Anderson v. Yates (Miss. 1924) 99 So. 499.
43 Kidder v. Hall, supra, n. 28.
44 Middlehauff v. State Banking Board (1922) 111 Tex. 561, 242 S. W. 442.
45 Lankford v. Shroeder (Okla. 1915) 147 Pac. 1049.
46 Guaranteed, Johnson v. Johnson (1924) 134 Miss. 729, 99 So. 369; Spry
v. Huning (1923) 46 S. D. 237, 191 N. W. 833; not guaranteed, Tyler County
State Bank v. Rhodes (Civil App. Tex. 1923) 256 S. W. 947.
47 Kidder v. Hall, supra, n. 27.
48 Hall v. Conaway (Tex. Civ. App. 1923) 252 S. W. 1105.
49 State v. Citizens' State Bank (1927) 115 Neb. 593, 214 N. W. 6.
Washington University Open Scholarship
